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COMMENTS




In administering the nation's antitrust laws,1 the United States Depart-
ment of Justice2 frequently brings civil and criminal actions against compa-
nies, or perhaps entire industries, that have allegedly engaged in illegal
conduct. Most antitrust cases initiated by the Department of Justice are
ultimately disposed of through consent decrees3 because antitrust litigation
can be very expensive and time consuming.4 Since its passage in 1974, the
Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act5 (APPA), or the Tunney Act,6 has
1. The most commonly employed antitrust statutes are the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-
7 (1988), and the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1988). Congress enacted the Sherman Act
in 1890 as a general prohibition against agreements and monopolies, or attempts to monopo-
lize, in restraint of trade. The Clayton Act was enacted in 1914 as an amendment to the
Sherman Act. The Clayton Act prohibits specific types of conduct, such as price discrimina-
tion, mergers, and tying arrangements, that would impede competition.
2. The Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-51 (1988), passed one month
prior to the Clayton Act in 1914, creates a general prohibition against unfair methods of com-
petition and permits the Federal Trade Commission to bring civil antitrust actions.
3. Antitrust consent decrees are defined generally as "an order of the court agreed upon
by representatives of the Attorney General and of the defendant, without trial of the conduct
challenged by the Attorney General." ANTITRUST SUBCOMM. OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT ON THE CONSENT DECREE PROGRAM OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ix (1959) [hereinafter 1959 REPORT].
In 1959, the House Judiciary Committee's Antitrust Subcommittee stated that "3 out of
every 4 of the antitrust cases in equity that the Attorney General has started have ended by
consent, with no issue litigated and adjudicated." Id. The House Judiciary Committee subse-
quently wrote that between 1955 and 1972, "approximately 80 percent of antitrust complaints
filed by the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice [were] terminated by pre-trial
settlement; in two years during the 1955-1972 period, 100 percent of all judgments in public
antitrust cases resulted from utilization of the consent decree process." H.R. REP. No. 1463,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6535, 6536 [hereinafter HOUSE
REPORT]; see also II PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 330a n. 1
(1978).
4. See generally II AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 3, 330.
5. 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)-(h).
6. "Tunney Act" and "APPA" are used interchangeably throughout this Comment.
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governed both the procedures7 by which parties to a decree submit the pro-
posed settlement to the court and the substantive standard' courts apply in
considering the decree. Despite the frequency with which existing consent
decrees are modified, however, the Tunney Act does not apply to modifica-
tion proceedings.
This absence of a congressional mandate leaves the Department of Justice,
and more importantly the courts, to fill the statutory void in modification
proceedings. Most district courts deny a request to modify an existing con-
sent decree if the other party opposes the proposed modification. 9 However,
7. Id. § 16(b)-(d), (g).
8. Id. § 16(e)-().
9. When the government opposes the modification, courts almost unanimously apply a
very strict standard in deciding whether to grant the defendant's request. The Supreme Court
of the United States established this stringent standard in United States v. Swift & Co., 286
U.S. 106 (1932). In Swift, the government and the five leading meat-packing companies in the
United States entered into a consent decree in 1920 that enjoined the meat-packers from selling
meat at the retail level and from entering any other food-related businesses at either the retail
or wholesale levels. Id. at 111. Ten years later, despite the government's opposition, the de-
fendants challenged the decree on the grounds that "conditions in the packing industry and in
the sale of groceries and other foods had been transformed so completely that the restraints of
the injunction, however appropriate and just in ... 1920, were now useless and oppressive."
Id. at 113. The Court denied the defendant's request, stating that "[n]othing less than a clear
showing of grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen conditions should lead us to change
what was decreed after years of litigation with the consent of all concerned." Id. at 119.
For an isolated case refusing to follow Swift, see United States v. Continental Can Co., 128
F. Supp. 932 (N.D. Cal. 1955) (holding that a defendant-sought modification that the govern-
ment opposed should be granted so long as the modification is consistent with the aims of the
decree). One commentator has concluded that Continental Can was "an aberration" because
"[t]he court did not even cite Swift." William M. Kelly, Note, Construction and Modification
of Antitrust Consent Decrees: New Approaches After the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act
of 1974, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 296, 305 n.85 (1977).
Some confusion exists as to how strict the court's standard of review should be when the
defendant opposes the modification. In Chrysler Corp. v. United States, 316 U.S. 556 (1942),
the government sought to modify a two-year old consent decree that extended a provision
prohibiting both Chrysler and Ford Motor Company from affiliating with any consumer fi-
nancing company. Id. at 558-60. Though Chrysler opposed the modification, the Court
granted the government's request. Id. at 564. In so doing, the Court reasoned that the appro-
priate standard was "whether the change served to effectuate or to thwart the basic purpose of
the original consent decree." Id. at 562. Thus, Chrysler suggests that while a defendant's
proposed modification that is opposed by the government must be accompanied by some type
of "grievous wrong," Swift, 286 U.S. at 119, a government-sought modification that is opposed
by the defendant will be granted so long as it serves the basic purpose of the original decree.
Chrysler, 316 U.S. at 562; see also Liquid Carbonics Corp. v. United States, 350 U.S. 869
(1955); Hughes v. United States, 342 U.S. 353 (1952).
Some commentators, however, believe that the liberalized standard laid down in Chrysler
was effectively overruled in Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 335 U.S. 303 (1948). See, e.g.,
John D. Anderson, Note, Modifications of Antitrust Consent Decrees: Over a Double Barrel, 84
MICH. L. REV. 134, 143 (1985). In Ford, the Court denied the government's request to extend
the same provision at issue in Chrysler. The Court ruled that the government's "mechanical
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in cases where the government and defendant agree to the proposed modifi-
cation, courts generally apply a deferential standard of review."0 A notable
exception is the American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T) decree court,
which in 1987 denied an uncontested modification" to the 1982 consent de-
cree' 2 that divested AT&T of its control and ownership of local telephone
companies.
The AT&T decree court's denial of the uncontested modification and the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit's subse-
quent reversal of that decision raise an important issue concerning district
courts' function in considering uncontested modifications to existing consent
decrees. While most courts view their role in determining the public interest
as a limited one,' 3 the AT&T decree court took an expansive view of its role
in assessing the government's decision to enter into14 and subsequently mod-
application" of Chrysler was misguided since "circumstances that were found extenuating on
behalf of the Government two years after the entry of the decree are hardly compelling ten
years afterward." Ford, 335 U.S. at 321. In effect, the Court seemed to be implying that
contrary to Chrysler, the government must also demonstrate the type of "grievous wrong"
enunciated in Swift. Thus, "whatever liberalization one reads into Chrysler must be largely
read out of Ford six years later." Note, Flexibility and Finality in Antitrust Consent Decrees, 80
HARV. L. REV. 1303, 1313 (1967). The Court recently stated that the Swift "grievous wrong"
standard does not apply to consent decrees arising out of institutional reform litigation, such as
school desegregation and prison reform cases. See Rufo v. Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail,
112 S. Ct. 748, 764-65 (1992); Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630 (1991). Unlike consent
decrees arising out of antitrust litigation, institutional reform decreees displace local deci-
sionmakers, thereby disturbing "'the allocation of powers within our federal system.'" Rufo,
112 S. Ct. at 764 (quoting Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 637). According to the Court, once the consti-
tutional violation that the decree addresses has been remedied, district courts should defer to
local decisionmakers' expertise in solving problems of institutional reform. Id. Thus, when
considering a request to modify a decree, district courts should avoid using the Swift standard,
regardless of whether the other party opposes the modification. Instead, courts should apply a
more "flexible standard" and approve modifications if the moving party "establish[es] that a
significant change in facts or law warrants revision of the decree and that the proposed modifi-
cation is suitably tailored to the changed circumstance." Id. at 765. While Rufo and Dowell
may prompt many local governments to petition for relief from decrees, see Bruce Fein, Loos-
ening the Ties of Consent Decrees, LEGAL TiMs, February 3, 1992, at 22, the decisions do not
replace the Swift standard as the appropriate test for considering contested modifications to
antitrust consent decrees.
10. See infra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
11. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525, 562-67 (D.D.C. 1987), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part, 900 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 283
(1990).
12. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co. (AT&T), 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982),
aff'd sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). Given the continual refer-
ence throughout this Comment to Judge Greene's A T& T decision and Western Electric deci-
sion, this Comment will refer to those decisions as being written by the "AT&T decree court."
13. See infra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
14. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 131.
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ify"5 the consent decree. The AT&T decree court's thorough standard of
review raises constitutional and practical concerns 6 that bring into focus the
need for a uniform standard for reviewing uncontested modifications.
This Comment first examines the APPA and the concerns that motivated
its enactment.' 7 Though the Tunney Act does not apply to modification
proceedings, this Comment demonstrates that most district courts borrow
the APPA's procedural and substantive components in considering modifi-
cations to existing consent decrees. '8 This Comment then analyzes the con-
cerns arising out of the AT&T decree court's standard of review to
demonstrate that the court's standard possibly is unconstitutional and jeop-
ardizes the viability of consent decrees as an alternative to litigation.' 9 This
Comment concludes with a proposal for reviewing uncontested modifica-
tions that protects the "public interest" while preserving the attractiveness of
consent decrees as an antitrust enforcement mechanism.2 °
I. UNCONTESTED MODIFICATION PROCEEDINGS: THE JUDICIAL ROLE
IN THE ABSENCE OF LEGISLATIVE GUIDANCE
A. The Tunney Act
Prior to enactment of the Tunney Act, statutory reference to antitrust
consent decrees was limited to section 5(a) of the Clayton Act.21 Section
5(a) stipulates that consent decrees entered into "before any testimony has
been taken" cannot be used as evidence against the defendant in any future
civil or criminal proceedings.22 This provision preserves antitrust defend-
ants' incentive to enter into consent decrees with the government,23 thereby
allowing the Department of Justice more effectively to allocate its resources
in administering antitrust laws.24
15. Western Elec., 673 F. Supp. at 562-67.
16. See infra notes 161-96 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 21-54 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 161-96 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 197-226 and accompanying text.
21. 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1988).
22. Id.
23. In fact, § 5(a) of the Clayton Act is the reason that consent decrees are used with such
frequency in civil antitrust actions. 1959 REPORT, supra note 3, at ix; see also supra note 3.
24. In its report accompanying the Tunney Act, the Senate wrote that "the consent decree
is of crucial importance as an enforcement tool, since it permits the allocation of resources
elsewhere." S. REP. No. 298, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1973) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT]. In
1971, the Supreme Court stated that consent decrees "normally embod[y] a compromise; in
exchange for the saving of cost and elimination of risk, the parties each give up something they
might have won had they proceeded with the litigation." United States v. Armour & Co., 402
U.S. 673, 681 (1971).
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The Tunney Act was enacted in 1974 in response to criticism of the con-
sent decree process dating back to 1955.25 In the mid-1950's, the govern-
ment and the defendant typically would submit the proposed decree to the
district court, which then would enter the decree after a cursory examination
and without the benefit of public comment.26 In its 1959 report on the
Department of Justice's consent decree program, the House Judiciary Com-
mittee's Antitrust Subcommittee voiced several concerns with the consent
decree program, including misgivings that the judiciary was effectively
"eliminated" from the process, that the process was cloaked in too much
secrecy, and that the process "amounted to a compromise of the Govern-
ment's interest."
27
In response to the report's recommendation that the process include input
from the judiciary and the public,28 the Department of Justice issued regula-
tions in 1961 that established a minimum thirty-day waiting period between
the parties' consent to the decree and the court's official approval of it.29
During this period the public could view the proposed decree and "state
comments, views or relevant allegations prior to the entry" of the decree.
30
The purpose of the thirty-day comment period was "to minimize secrecy and
insure that consent decrees were in the public interest.,
31
In the early 1970's, however, the Justice Department's settlement of three
different antitrust suits with the International Telephone and Telegraph Cor-
poration (ITT)32 rekindled Congressional dissatisfaction with the govern-
25. 1959 REPORT, supra note 3, at x.
26. Id. For a lengthier analysis of the consent decree process prior to the Tunney Act and
the negligible role the judiciary played, see Clark E. Walter, Comment, Consent Decrees and
the Judicial Function, 20 CATH. U. L. REV. 312, 315-16, 320-23, 326-27 (1970).
27. 1959 REPORT, supra note 3, at x. For the purposes of analyzing problems with the
consent decree program at that time, the Subcommittee report focused on two consent decrees
that the government had entered. First, the report examined the process by which the govern-
ment entered into the 1956 consent decree with AT&T and concluded that the decree was
"devoid of merit and ineffective as an instrument to accomplish the purposes of the antitrust
laws." Id. at 290; see also Celilianne Green, Comment, The 1982 AT&T Consent Decree-
Strengthening the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, 27 How. L.J. 1611, 1619-26 (1984).
Second, the report looked into the negotiations surrounding both the entry into and the admin-
istration of the oil pipeline industry consent decree. The report concluded that the oil pipeline
decree "illustrates the inherent danger that consent settlement procedures may nullify the
Government's antitrust policies and objectives, and protect defendants in the continuation of
activities originally challenged by the Attorney General." 1959 REPORT, supra note 3, at 294.
28. 1959 REPORT, supra note 3, at 304.
29. 28 C.F.R. § 50.1 (1970).
30. Id. § 50.1(a).
31. Janet L. McDavid et al., Antitrust Consent Decrees: Ten Years of Experience Under
the Tunney Act, 52 ANTrrRuST L.J. 883, 885 (1983).
32. United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp. (ITT), 1971 Trade Cas. (CCH)
73,665 (D. Conn. 1971); United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp. (ITT), 1971 Trade
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ment's consent decree program. The decrees afforded the government much
less relief than it had sought in the original complaints,3 3 causing some ob-
servers to allege that the decrees were settled for political reasons unrelated
to the public interest.3 4 The "public suspicion"3 5 surrounding the ITT con-
sent decrees provided Congress with the "catalyst ' 3 6 for passing the Tunney
Act. The APPA, consequently, imposes obligations on the government, de-
fendants, and courts to ensure that courts are "an independent force rather
than a rubber stamp in reviewing consent decrees." '
Under the APPA, the government and defendants must file the proposed
consent decree with the court at least sixty days before the decree's effective
date, along with a competitive impact statement (CIS) prepared by the gov-
ernment that explains the reasons for the decree and its details."8 In addi-
tion, the government is required to publish the proposed decree and CIS in
the Federal Register.3 9
The government has two additional obligations. First, the APPA requires
the government, at least sixty days prior to the proposed decree's effective
date, to publish in various newspapers summaries of the proposed decree
and CIS. 40 Second, the Tunney Act requires the Attorney General to estab-
Cas. (CCH) 73,666 (D. Conn. 1971); United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 1971
Trade Cas. (CCH) 73,667 (N.D. Ill. 1971). The suits involved ITT's existing mergers with
Canteen Corporation and ITT's proposed mergers with Grinnell Corporation and Hartford
Fire Insurance Company.
33. McDavid et al., supra note 31, at 885 & n.12 (pointing out that, though the govern-
ment's suit sought divestiture of Canteen, Grinnell, and Hartford Fire, the consent decree
required ITT to divest ownership only in Canteen and Grinnell but not Hartford Fire and to
disgorge the profits earned between the acquisition and the eventual divestiture).
34. Specifically, one commentator has speculated that the Department of Justice settled
the cases in return for allowing ITT to help finance the 1972 Republican National Convention
in Miami, Florida. See Note, The ITT Dividend: Reform of Department of Justice Consent
Decree Procedures, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 593, 603-06 (1973); see also Hearings on the Nomina-
tion of Richard G. Kleindienst to be Attorney General Before the Senate Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 284 (1972).
35. Consent Decree Bills: Hearings on HR. 9203, HR. 9947, and S. 782 Before the Sub-
comm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. 38 (1973) [hereinafter House Hearings] (statement of Sen. Tunney).
36. Id. at 36 (statement of Rep. Rodino).
37. Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act: Hearings on S. 782 and S. 1088 Before the
Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. 1 (1973) [hereinafter Senate Hearings] (statement of Sen. Tunney).
38. 15 U.S.C. § 16(b).
39. Id. The Federal Register is a daily government publication commonly used by federal
agencies to announce proposed changes to rules and regulations. Agencies typically invite the
public to submit comments on the proposals. At the close of the comment period, finalized
changes are printed in the Federal Register and appear in the Code of Federal Regulations. See
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 612 (6th ed. 1990).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 16(c).
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lish a comment period4" following initial publication of the proposed decree.
The Attorney General is required to respond to the comments and publish
the responses in the Federal Register.42
Beyond the obligation to file the proposed consent decree with the court,43
defendants have only one other obligation under the APPA. Within ten
days of filing the proposed decree, defendants must file with the court a de-
scription of "any and all written or oral communications" they have had
with the government that are relevant to the proposal.'
The courts' obligation under the Tunney Act is to determine whether the
proposed consent decree "is in the public interest"45 rather than to engage in
"judicial rubber stamping," which legislators felt previously had been the
case." Though "public interest" is not defined by the Act, courts may con-
sider the impact the proposed decree would have "upon the public gener-
ally."94 7 In making their public interest determination, courts also may
invoke the APPA's procedural mechanisms, such as conducting a hearing or
appointing a special master.48
While the Tunney Act applies to proposed consent decrees that have been
filed with the court,49 it is silent regarding the establishment of procedural
and substantive standards for modifying existing consent decrees. The
APPA's references to modifications of consent decrees s "relate[ ] only to
41. The comment period under the Tunney Act lasts for the entire sixty-day period in
which the proposed decree lies before the district court. Id § 16(d). During that period, the
public is invited to submit comments to the government regarding the proposed decree. Most
comments come from private parties who will be affected, either adversely or beneficially, by
the decree.
42. Id.
43. Id. § 16(b).
44. Id § 16(g).
45. Id § 16(e).
46. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 8.
47. 15 U.S.C. § 16(e).
48. Id. § 16(o. A special master is "[a] master appointed to act as the representative of
the court in some particular act or transaction, as, to make a sale of property under a decree."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 975 (6th ed. 1990). Under the Tunney Act, district court judges,
in making their public interest determinations, may choose to appoint a special master to aid
the court in understanding the complexities of an industry or company that the government is
suing. 15 U.S.C. § 16(0(2).
The final provision of the Tunney Act stipulates that neither the CIS nor the public interest
proceedings can be used against any defendants. Id. § 16(h). For a more detailed analysis of
the APPA's provisions, see Eric J. Branfman, Antitrust Consent Decrees-A Review and Evalu-
ation of the First Seven Years Under the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, 27 ANTITRUST
BULL. 303, 306-27 (1982).
49. 15 U.S.C. § 16(b).
50. Id. § 16(b)(5), (e)(l).
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modification of the proposal,"'" and not to the final decree. If Congress had
intended the statute to cover modification proceedings, then presumably
such standards would have been included in the provisions that outline the
courts' public interest obligations under the APPA.52
The APPA's legislative history also is silent on the issue of modification
proceedings. The report of the House Judiciary Committee stated that the
APPA "is designed to... regularize and make uniform judicial and public
procedures that depend upon the Justice Department's decision to enter into a
proposal for a consent decree." 3 Similarly, the Senate Judiciary Committee
concluded in its report that the APPA "provides that the district court shall
make an independent determination as to whether or not the entry of a pro-
posed consent decree is in the public interest as expressed by the antitrust
laws."54 Neither report refers to the standard of review courts should em-
ploy when modifying existing consent decrees.
R Modification Proceedings: Relying on the Tunney Act
Though the APPA does not on its face apply to modification proceedings,
many district courts have relied on its procedural and substantive elements
when considering such modifications.5" In fact, one court has expressly held
that the Tunney Act applies to the modification of existing consent decrees.
In United States v. Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association,56 Judge Curtis
of the United States District Court of the Central District of California re-
quired the parties to comply with the Tunney Act before extending a 1969
consent decree, which prohibited automobile manufacturers from collabo-
rating on manufacturing pollution control devices." The court, however,
did not explain its reasoning; it simply stated that the APPA applied and
ordered compliance.5"
One other court has followed the Motor Vehicle decision. In its opinion
approving the 1982 AT&T consent decree,59 the AT&T decree court con-
cluded that the Tunney Act applied to modifications of consent decrees.6°
51. Kelly, supra note 9, at 308 n. 110.
52. 15 U.S.C. § 16(e), (f).
53. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 6-7 (emphasis added).
54. SENATE REPORT, supra note 24, at 5 (emphasis added).
55. See infra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
56. 1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,370 (C.D. Cal. 1981).
57. Id. at 74,704.
58. Id.
59. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co. (AT&T), 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982),
aff'd sub nora. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
60. The original AT&T consent decree was the product of a government suit which began
in 1949 but was settled in 1956 in the United States District Court for the District of New
[Vol. 41:665
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Specifically, the court indicated that the APPA applies to proposed consent
decrees and to modifications of existing decrees. It held that "[t]he stan-
dards are the same whether the [proposed consent decree] is regarded as
'new' or as a modification of the 1956 decree in the Western Electric
action."
6 1
With the exception of the Motor Vehicle and AT&T decree courts, how-
ever, district courts have been largely unwilling to apply the APPA to any
type of modification proceedings, regardless of whether the motion is uncon-
Jersey. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,246 (D.N.J. 1956).
In 1974, the government brought suit against AT&T in the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia but settled the case in 1982. The parties submitted the proposed
settlement as a modification to the 1956 consent decree. The United States District Court for
the District of New Jersey approved the modifications to the 1956 consent decree. United
States v. Western Elec. Co., 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,454, at 72,548 (D.N.J.), vacated
sub nor. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co. (AT&T), 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
64,476 (D.D.C. 1982). In considering the requested modifications, the court did not apply the
Tunney Act but concluded that the modification to the 1956 decree was "in the general public
interest." Id at 72,548.
The court then transferred the case to the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia since "Judge Greene's intimate familiarity with the details of the trial... will better
equip him to deal with the transition" of AT&T's reorganization pursuant to the modified
consent decree. Id. At that point, the parties intended to "proceed with the functional
equivalent of a Tunney Act proceeding in order to permit all interested persons an opportunity
to file comments." United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co. (AT&T), 1982-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 64,465, at 72,604 (D.D.C. 1982) (statement of Gerald A. Connell, counsel for the
government) (emphasis added). Both parties believed that since the settlement was a modifica-
tion to the 1956 consent decree, strict compliance with the Tunney Act was not necessary.
Instead, the parties argued that Judge Greene, upon transfer of the case, "would have the
inherent equitable powers fully equivalent to the power under the Tunney Act to find that
proposed modification of that decree either in the public interest or not, and to dispose of it in
accordance with that determination." Id.
Judge Greene, however, preferred that the settlement be viewed as a proposed consent de-
cree settling the case in his court, id. at 72,605, wherein the Tunney Act would apply to the
proceedings. Judge Greene believed that he had to
make certain that the Tunney Act is applied and that the public interest determina-
tion on relief agreed to on this case is also applied .... This case is too important to
the judicial process, to the parties, and to the country to have it concluded on a
haphazard basis and without the public exposure mandated by the Congress.
Id. at 72,611-12 (statement of Judge Greene). Judge Greene ordered that both the dismissal
and the modification to the 1956 consent decree be vacated and that both the 1949 suit against
Western Electric, which led to the 1956 decree, and the 1974 suit against AT&T be consoli-
dated. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co. (AT&T), 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
64,476, at 72,658-60 (D.D.C. 1982). In addition, since both parties agreed not to litigate the
issue of whether the Tunney Act should apply to the proceedings before Judge Greene, the
court concluded that "it is [not] necessary to render a decision on the technical applicability of
the Act." Id. at 72,657 n.3. Judge Greene nevertheless ordered the parties to comply with the
Tunney Act for purposes of considering the proposed consent decree between the government
and AT&T. Id. at 72,612.
61. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 147 n.67.
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tested.62 Commentators also are in general agreement that the Tunney Act
does not apply to modifications of existing consent decrees. 63 Nonetheless,
while district courts have not applied the APPA in uncontested modification
proceedings, they have not ignored it either. In United States v. American
Cyanamid Co.," the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
advised that the Tunney Act "provides useful guidance to the courts in de-
ciding how modification procedures should be addressed.
65
Most district courts have taken the American Cyanamid court's advice.
In many cases since the passage of the APPA, courts have employed the
public interest language found in the APPA and required the parties to pro-
vide APPA-type notice of the proposed modifications and an opportunity for
public comment.66 Some courts have gone further to require that the gov-
62. iHowever, one court concluded that the public interest determination in considering
whether to terminate a consent decree by mutual consent "is the same standard that a district
court applies in deciding whether to enter an initial consent decree submitted by the govern-
ment in an antitrust proceeding." United States v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 662 F.
Supp. 865, 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). Interestingly, the court cited footnote 67 in Judge Greene's
decision approving the AT&T consent decree as authority for the proposition that the APPA's
standards apply to termination of consent decrees. See AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 147 n.67. One
could argue that if the APPA logically applies to both the entry and termination of consent
decrees, it should necessarily apply to any intermediate proceedings (i.e., modifications to con-
sent decrees).
63. For example, one commentator insisted:
The fact that Congress addressed the issue of modifications but chose not to mention
them in the Act is persuasive evidence that Congress did not intend to bring modifi-
cations under the APPA. Motor Vehicle's (and perhaps AT&T's) extension of the
APPA to modifications is therefore not supported by either the wording of the stat-
ute or the relevant legislative history.
Anderson, supra note 9, at 140-41; see also Green, supra note 27, at 1632.
64. 719 F.2d 558 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1101 (1984).
65. Id. at 565 n.7. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals also has concluded that the Tunney
Act should apply to modifications of consent decrees. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 900
F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 283 (1990). On appeal from Judge
Greene's decision to maintain the MFJ's core restrictions, the D.C. Circuit stated that "uncon-
tested motions for modification... should be approved so long as the modifications satisfy the
'public interest' standard embodied in the Tunney Act." Id. at 295; see also Morris E. Lasker,
The Tunney Act Revisited: The Role of the Court, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 937, 939 (1983) (stating
that, for practical purposes, "there is no reason to believe that [the APPA] does not apply as
much to the consent modification of a decree, as to the framing of the original decree").
66. See United States v. Parker Hannifin Corp., 1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,066 (N.D.
Ohio 1985) (requiring public notice and an opportunity for public comment); United States v.
Waste Management, Inc., 1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,151 (D.Col. 1986) (same); United
States v. Radio Corp. of Am., 1988-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,275 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (same);
United States v. First Nat'l Supermarkets, Inc., 1989-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,721 (N.D. Ohio
1987) (same).
In several post-APPA enactment cases, courts have approved uncontested modifications
without requiring notice or mentioning that the modifications were in the public interest. See
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 1974-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 75,378 (S.D.N.Y.
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ernment provide supporting evidence or proof of its conclusion that the pro-
posed uncontested modifications are in the public interest.
67
In each case, regardless of the burden placed on the parties, district courts
approved the parties' proposed modifications, generally noting that the gov-
ernment should be accorded a certain amount of deference in making public
interest determinations.68 One court concluded that "the Attorney General
is the representative of the public interest in antitrust cases brought by the
government, and that the 'government is in a better position to determine
what serves the public interest best.' "69 Consequently, district courts gener-
ally view their role in considering uncontested modifications as limited:
their analysis is limited to ensuring that proposed modifications are in the
public interest and that the government has not engaged in bad faith or
malfeasance. 7 °
A minority of district courts, however, prefer a slightly more expansive
role in consent decree modifications. In an uncontested modification to a
decree 71 that was considered after enactment of the APPA, the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois articulated a more
expansive judicial role than have other district courts.72 Specifically, the
court established a procedure to allow for public participation that also
accords some deference to the parties in agreement.73 In cases involving
consented-to modifications, the 1975 Swift court stated, "the court is em-
powered to implement a procedure designed to produce, in the public inter-
1974); United States v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 1974-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) $ 75,141
(N.D. Ohio 1974); United States v. United Fruit Co., 1978-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) $ 62,001 (E.D.
La. 1978); United States v. Hartford-Empire Co., 1978-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) $ 62,057 (N.D.
Ohio 1976); United States v. Swift & Co., 1980-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,185 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
67. See United States v. Swift & Co., 1975-1 Trade Cas. (CCII) 60,201, at 65,706 (N.D.
Ill. 1975) (requiring the parties to place on the record reasons in support of the proposed
modification since "[t]he Government has the continuing obligation to insure the pro-competi-
tive effects of the modification"); United States v. National Fin. Adjusters, Inc., 1985-2 Trade
Cas. (CCH) $ 66,856, at 64,248 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (asking the government to provide a "rea-
soned determination" that the proposed modification will "serve the public interest"); United
States v. Yoder Bros., Inc., 1989-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,723, at 61,793 (N.D. Ohio 1986)
(requesting "the government to file evidentiary proof in support of its conclusion that 'the
proposed modifications would not harm competition in the chrysanthemum industry' ").
68. See Swift, 1975-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 65,702; National Fin. Adjusters, 1985-2 Trade
Cas. (CCH) at 64,248; Yoder Bros., 1989-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 61,795.
69. Yoder Bros., 1989-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 61,795 (quoting United States v. Shubert,
305 F. Supp. 1288, 1292 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)) (citation omitted).
70. See, e.g., National Fin. Adjusters, 1985-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 64,248; Yoder Bros.,
1989-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 61,795.
71. Swift, 1975-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 60,201. For a description of the Swift decree, see
supra note 9.
72. Id. at 65,702-03.
73. Id.
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est, an agreed modification that 'enjoy[s] a solid presumption that it was
founded in fact and supported by reason.' "74 The Swift court felt that the
"procedure," at a minimum, should include notice and a requirement that
the parties substantiate their support for the proposed modifications." The
Swift court also required district courts to "consider the merits of any claim
of bad faith or malfeasance on the part of the Government."76
With the exception of the AT&T decree court, the 1975 Swift case repre-
sents the most expansive role a district court has assumed in a proceeding
involving an uncontested modification. The 1975 Swift court, however, still
recognized that district courts must accord some deference to government
determinations since "a consent decree is a contract between the government
and the defendants ' 77 and "'the court's time, talents, and resources are se-
verely limited.' , The court approved the proposed modifications.79
While many district courts are not willing to extend the APPA to consent
decree modifications, they follow the Second Circuit's suggestion in Ameri-
74. Id. at 65,703 (quoting United States v. Swift & Co., 189 F. Supp. 885, 906 (N.D. Ill.
1960)) (alteration in original). The meat-packers consent decree is a useful vessel for analyzing
the courts' role in modifying consent decrees. The decree was entered in 1920. See supra note
9. In 1928, two meat-packing corporations that were parties to the decree sought to have the
decree vacated on procedural grounds. Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311 (1928).
Justice Brandeis, writing for the Court, denied the petitioners' motion. Id at 332. The meat-
packers sought to modify the decree again four years later. United States v. Swift & Co., 286
U.S. 106 (1932). The Court again denied the meat-packers' request. Id. at 119-20. In 1960,
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois considered a unilateral
request by the defendants that all the prohibitions in the decree be lifted. United States v.
Swift & Co., 189 F. Supp. 885 (N.D. Ill. 1960). Since the government opposed the modifica-
tion, the court properly applied the Swift standard established by Justice Cardozo in the 1932
Swift case and denied the defendants' request. Id at 913.
In 1971, the same district court approved an uncontested modification that permitted the
defendants to engage in non-retail operations in the food market. United States v. Swift & Co.,
1971 Trade Cas. (CCH) 73,760 (N.D. Ill. 1971). The 1975 Swift case involved another
uncontested modification that permitted the defendants to engage in retail operations in nu-
merous non-food markets, such as cigars, china, and brick. United States v. Swift & Co., 1975-
1 Trade Cas. (CCH) $ 60,201 (N.D. Ill. 1975). After considering the parties' supporting infor-
mation and the general public's comments, the court approved the modification. Id. at 65,706.
In 1980, the court considered the last proposed modification to the decree. In that case, the
court approved uncontested modifications that provided for termination of the decree at a later
date and, in the interim, lifted the restrictions against the meat-packers' involvement in the
transportation and distribution of products. United States v. Swift & Co., 1980-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 63,185 (N.D. I1. 1980). Finally, in 1981, the meat-packers decree was vacated.
United States v. Swift & Co., 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,464 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
75. Swift, 1975-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 65,703.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 65,702.
78. Id. (quoting United States v. CIBA Corp., 1970 Trade Cas. (CCH) 73,319, at 89,262
(S.D.N.Y. 1970)).
79. Id. at 65,706.
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can Cyanamid and look to the APPA for guidance. Courts also demonstrate
a significant amount of deference to the government and its determinations
regarding the public interest. Regardless of the stringency of review im-
posed on the parties and their proposed modifications, courts consistently
grant the motions to modify. As one commentator noted, "[w]here the par-
ties have agreed to modification, judicial approval tends to be pro forma."'s
C. The AT&T Decree Court's Approach to Consent Decree Modification
and the D.C. Circuit's Response
The AT&T decree court is a glaring exception to the trend among district
courts to grant uncontested modifications to consent decrees."' The govern-
ment suit that gave rise to the 1982 consent decree was initiated in 1974.
The government alleged that AT&T had violated section 2 of the Sherman
Act 2 by monopolizing "a broad variety of telecommunications services and
equipment."8 3 To break AT&T's monopoly control of the telecommunica-
tions industry, the government sought, and the court ultimately decreed, di-
vestiture of AT&T's ownership and control of its twenty-two operating
80. Kelly, supra note 9, at 304 n.71. Aproforma decision is defined as a decision which
"was rendered... merely to facilitate further proceedings." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1212
(6th ed. 1990).
Another commentator stated that "i]n consented-to cases, the courts have been fairly defer-
ential to the parties. In most cases, the court will follow the Justice Department's lead and
modify a decree in accordance with the Department's wishes." Anderson, supra note 9, at 135
n.8. In addition, one commentator noted that "[t]he courts usually have approved such con-
sented-to changes with only perfunctory statements." Edwin M. Zimmerman, The Antitrust
Division's Decree Review and Private Litigation Programs, 51 ANTITRusT L.J. 105, 113 (1982).
81. See supra notes 68-80 and accompanying text.
82. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988) (prohibiting monopolies, and attempts to monopolize, that re-
strain trade); see also supra note 1.
83. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co. (AT&T), 552 F. Supp. 131, 139 (D.D.C.
1982), aff'd sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). In particular, the
government alleged that AT&T's monopoly control of the local telephone network through its
22 Bell Operating Companies (BOCs) enabled AT&T to discriminate against competitors in
two distinct ways. First, AT&T was discriminating against competing long distance service
providers. Id. at 161. To provide long distance telephone service between two points, a carrier
must interconnect with the local telephone network at each point. Allegedly AT&T would not
permit competing long distance providers to interconnect with the local telephone networks
which were owned by AT&T's BOCs. Id. at 161-62. As a result, competitors effectively were
frozen out of the long distance service market. Id. at 162.
Second, AT&T's control of the local telephone network enabled it to discriminate against
competing telecommunications equipment manufacturers. Id. The government claimed the
BOCs were compelled to purchase their equipment from AT&T's equipment subsidiary, West-
ern Electric, "even though other equipment manufacturers produced better products or prod-
ucts of identical quality at lower prices." Id. at 163. Consequently, competing manufacturers
were never able to gain a foothold in the manufacturing market. Id. at 162-63.
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companies known as Bell Operating Companies (BOCs). s4 In turn, the
BOCs, which inherited sole ownership and control of the local telephone
network, were prohibited from offering long distance service, 5 manufactur-
ing telecommunications equipment,16 and providing information services.8 7
The court reasoned that "[p]articipation in these fields carries with it a sub-
stantial risk that the Operating Companies will use the same anticompetitive
84. Id. at 165-66, 170-74, 178 n. 199. The full text of the consent decree is appended to the
AT&Topinion. Id. at 226-34. The 1982 consent decree is commonly referred to as the Modifi-
cation of Final Judgment (MFJ) because it technically supplanted the 1956 consent decree. Id
at 141 & n.31.
The MFJ imposed various obligations on both AT&T and the BOCs. In particular, section
I of the MFJ reorganized AT&T, mainly through divestiture of AT&T's ownership and con-
trol of the BOCs. Id. at 226-27. Once separated from AT&T, the BOCs were integrated into
seven regional companies to act as holding companies for the respective operating companies.
United States v. Western Elec. Co., 569 F. Supp. 1057 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub nom. California v.
United States, 464 U.S. 1013 (1983). The seven Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs),
commonly referred to as the "Baby Bells," are Ameritech, Bell Atlantic, BellSouth, NYNEX
Corporation, Pacific Telesis Group, Southwestern Bell Corporation, and US West, Inc. Each
RBOC is comprised of one or more BOCs. For example, C&P Telephone (a BOC) is a subsidi-
ary of Bell Atlantic (an RBOC).
Section II(D) contains the "line[s] of business" restrictions. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 227-28.
Specifically, the decree prohibited the RBOCs from entering into the markets for long distance
service, equipment manufacturing and information services. Id. Section VII of the decree
contains boilerplate language to ensure that the district court will continue to exercise jurisdic-
tion over the enforcement and modification of the decree. Id at 231. The court authored and
submitted section VIII of the decree to the parties as a condition for entering the decree. Id at
225; see also United States v. Western Elec. Co, 673 F. Supp. 525, 532, 533 n.24 (D.D.C.
1987), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 900 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 111
S. Ct. 283 (1990). Section VIII establishes the standard of review for modification proceedings
in which one of the parties to the MFJ contests the modification. Western Elec., 900 F.2d at
295.
85. For a discussion of the reasons behind the long distance service restriction in the MFJ,
see AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 188-89. Note that the terms "long distance services" and "inter-
exchange services" are synonymous. Western Elec., 673 F. Supp. at 541 ("interexchange ser-
vice may be equated with long distance service").
86. For a discussion of the reasons for the manufacturing restriction in the MFJ, see
AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 190-91.
87. Information services is "an umbrella description of a variety of services including elec-
tronic publishing and other enhanced uses of telecommunications." Id. at 189. Though the
information services industry was in its infancy in 1982, the AT&T decree court reasoned that
since "[a]ll information services are provided directly via the telecommunications network,"
the BOCs would "have the same incentives and the same ability to discriminate against com-
peting information service providers that they would have with respect to competing inter-
exchange carriers." Id. Thus, the consent decree prohibited the BOCs from providing
information services. For a discussion of the reasons for the information services restriction in
the MFJ, see id. at 189-90.
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techniques used by AT&T in order to thwart the growth of their own
competitors."88
The AT&T decree court recognized that the parties89 to the decree might
seek to remove the fines of business restrictions contained in section IH(D) of
the Modification of Final Judgment (MFJ),9' which prohibits the Regional
Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs), the holding companies for the BOCs,91
from entering into the markets for long distance service, equipment manu-
facturing, and information services. To accommodate the parties, the court
agreed to establish a triennial review procedure, whereby the government
"report[s] to the [c]ourt every three years concerning the continuing need for
the restrictions imposed by the decree."92 The AT&T decree court con-
cluded that in determining whether to remove an MFJ restriction, it would
apply the same standard as when it initially imposed the restriction: "a re-
striction will be removed upon a showing that there is no substantial possi-
bility that an Operating Company could use its monopoly power [over the
local telephone network] to impede competition in the relevant market."9
At the first triennial review, the RBOCs petitioned the court to remove all
three of the MFJ's restrictions.94 The government supported lifting the re-
strictions for information services and manufacturing9 5 but not the long dis-
tance service restriction.9 6 AT&T, one of the three parties to the MFJ,97
opposed lifting the long distance service and manufacturing restrictions but
88. Id. at 224; see also Western Elec., 673 F. Supp. at 532 (stating that the "line of busi-
ness restrictions, embodied in section II(D) of the decree, were the necessary counterpart to
the divestiture itself").
89. In most cases, the parties to a consent decree are the government and defendant(s)
named in the government's original complaint. The MFJ, however, is different. While the
government and AT&T are clearly recognized as parties to the decree, the divestiture of
AT&T pursuant to the MFJ means that the BOCs are a third party to the MFJ, having re-
ceived their autonomy from the decree. The AT&T decree court recognizes this distinction.
United States v. Western Elec. Co., 767 F. Supp. 308, 311 n.5 (D.D.C. 1991).
90. See supra note 84.
91. See supra note 84.
92. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co. (AT&T), 552 F. Supp. 131, 195 (D.D.C.
1982), aff'd sub. nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
93. Id. This is the same standard found in section VIII(C) of the MFJ. Id. at 231.
94. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525, 528 (D.D.C. 1987), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part, 900 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 283 (1990).
Two of the seven RBOCs, Ameritech and Bell Atlantic, actually petitioned for less than abso-
lute removal of the long distance service restriction. Id. at 544 n.84.
95. Id. at 552-67.
96. Id. at 540-52. The government opposed lifting the long distance service restriction
because local government regulations permitting only one local telephone service provider re-
mained in place in most parts of the country. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 900 F.2d
283, 292 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 283 (1990).
97. See supra note 89.
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did not oppose lifting the information services restriction.9" Thus, for pur-
poses of analyzing the proper standard of review in considering the proposed
modifications to the MFJ, the court had before it one uncontested modifica-
tion for information services and two contested modifications for long dis-
tance service and manufacturing.
The AT&T decree court did not address the distinction between contested
and uncontested modifications prior to rejecting them.99 Instead, the court
applied the rigorous section VIII(C) standard to all three petitions to modify
the MFJ, l" requiring a showing that" 'there is no substantialpossibility that
[an Operating Company] could use its monopoly power to impede competi-
tion in the market it seeks to enter.' "101 The court denied the petitions
because it concluded that the RBOCs "would have the same incentives as
well as the same means for discrimination, manipulation, and cross-subsidi-
zation that the Bell System possessed before the break-up."' 2
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit affirmed the portion of the district court's opinion that preserved
the MFJ restrictions on long distance service and manufacturing. °3 The
D.C. Circuit, however, reversed and remanded the district court's decision
to preserve the information services restriction." The D.C. Circuit seized
on the distinction between uncontested and contested modifications to ex-
isting decrees, and argued that the district court incorrectly applied the sec-
tion VIII(C) standard for reviewing uncontested modifications to consent
decrees. 105 According to the court, both the text of the decree and accompa-
nying statements indicated that the parties intended section VII to apply to
98. It is important to note that AT&T did not support the removal of the information
services restriction. Rather, they chose not to oppose lifting this restriction. Western Elec.,
673 F. Supp. at 534 n.33.
99. The court did note in its opinion that one of the RBOCs, BellSouth, argued that since
the three parties to the decree agreed to removing the information services restriction, the
court should approve the parties request. Id. at 534. The court considered BellSouth's argu-
ment a "curious observation," id., and "frivolous." Id. at 535.
100. Id. at 532-40.
101. Id. at 532 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.
(AT&T), 552 F. Supp. 131, 231 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub. non. Maryland v. United States, 460
U.S. 1001 (1983)).
102. Id. at 602.
103. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 900 F.2d 283, 300-01, 301-05 (D.C. Cir.) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 283 (1990).
104. Id. at 305-09.
105. "The trial court expressly noted that the standard in section VIII(C) would supplant
'[t]he test usually applied to a contested modification... [as] set forth in United States v. Swift
& Co.'" Id. at 306 (alterations in original) (quoting AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 195 n. 266).
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uncontested modifications. 106 Consequently, unopposed petitions to modify
a consent decree "should be approved so long as the modifications satisfy the
'public interest' standard embodied in the Tunney Act." 10 7
According to the D.C. Circuit, the "public interest test" arising out of the
Tunney Act requires district courts to approve uncontested modifications
"so long as the resulting array of rights and obligations is within the zone of
settlements consonant with the public interest today."' 0 The D.C. Circuit's
"zone of settlements" standard means the court is obligated to approve the
uncontested modification unless the district court is certain 1o that the pro-
posed modification would "impede competition."" 0 In other words, unop-
posed modifications that are not certain to impede competition are believed
to be within the "zone of settlements.""' On remand, 1 2 the AT&T decree
court concluded it could not determine with certainty that lifting the infor-
mation services restriction would impede competition or "have the effect of
106. Id Section VII of the MFJ is boilerplate language contained in most consent decrees
that provides for the district courts' retention of jurisdiction over the administration and modi-
fication of consent decrees. Specifically, section VII states that "[j]urisdiction is retained by
this Court for the purpose of enabling any of the parties to this Modification of Final Judgment
... to apply to this Court ... for the modification of any of the provisions." AT&T, 552 F.
Supp. at 231.
Section VIII(C) of the MFJ sets a more rigorous standard for removal of section II(D)'s
restrictions because it requires the "petitioning BOC" to demonstrate to the court that "there
is no substantial possibility" that its market power will impede competition in the market that
the BOC proposes to enter. Id at 231. Thus, while section VII only requires that the court
find that the proposed modification satisfies the Tunney Act's public interest requirement, sec-
tion VIII(C) requires the BOC to conclusively demonstrate not only that the modification is in
the public interest, but also that it will not result in less competition.
107. Western Elec., 900 F.2d at 295.
108. Id at 307.
109. Under the D.C. Circuit's standard, the requirement of "certainty" in determining
whether the proposed modification is in the public interest is crucial. The district courts
should view the proposed modifications through the limited prism of antitrust law and not be
concerned with whether they evince the appropriate public policy. Consequently, proposed
modifications that may not be the optimal policy but are consistent with antitrust law are not
open to judicial scrutiny. See infra notes 205-26 and accompanying text.
110. The D.C. Circuit defines "impeding competition" as "hav[ing] the ability to raise
prices or restrict output in the market [the BOC] seeks to enter." Western Elec., 900 F.2d at
296.
111. Id. at 307.
112. Since the D.C. Circuit could not conclude that Judge Greene's refusal to lift the infor-
mation services restriction was "not infected by the court's legal error concerning the proper
standard of review," id. at 308, the court reversed that portion of the district court's decision
and remanded the case for further proceedings. Id. at 309.
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raising price [sic] or restricting output in that market."' 3 Thus, the court
removed the restriction, "albeit with considerable reluctance."
'"14
D. The Roots of Judicial Deference in Uncontested Modification
Proceedings
In defining the standard for uncontested modifications, the D.C. Circuit
equated it with the public interest test used for consideration of proposed
consent decrees."' Most district courts have exercised significant deference
towards the government during settlement proceedings given that "[tjhe At-
torney General is the representative of the public interest in antitrust cases
brought by the government."
' "16
The extent of judicial deference at settlement proceedings was much
stronger prior to enactment of the Tunney Act. In Sam Fox Publishing Co.
v. United States,' for example, the Supreme Court established that the judi-
ciary should avoid second guessing the "wisdom" of government decisions
to negotiate and enter into consent decrees, "at least in the absence of any
claim of bad faith or malfeasance on the part of the Government in so
acting."118
113. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 767 F. Supp. 308, 330 (D.D.C. 1991).
114. Id. at 327. The AT&T decree court was reluctant to lift the information services
restriction because it believed that given that the BOCs possess the incentive and the ability to
discriminate against their competitors, they should be excluded from the information services
market. Id. at 330. Nevertheless, the court was not prepared to conclude with certainty that
the removal of the restriction would impede competition and, therefore, granted the modifica-
tion. Id. at 332.
Out of concern that it possibly misinterpreted the D.C. Circuit's remand opinion, the AT&T
decree court imposed a stay on its decision to lift the information services restriction to allow
interested parties to appeal the decision to the D.C. Circuit. Id. at 332-33. The D.C. Circuit
later lifted the stay, stating that imposition of the stay was "an abuse of discretion" because
nothing in the record indicated that Judge Greene's decision to lift the restriction would be
reversed. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1991-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) T 69,610, at 66,711
(D.C. Cir. 1991) (per curiam). On appeal, the Supreme Court denied a motion to reimpose the
stay. American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 366 (1991).
115. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
116. Control Data Corp. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 306 F. Supp. 839, 845 (D.
Minn. 1969).
117. 366 U.S. 683 (1961).
118. Id at 689. Sam Fox involved a 1941 consent decree that, inter alia, governed the
internal affairs of an organization of writers and publishers of musical compositions known as
the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP). Id. at 685. Several of
ASCAP's smaller publishers challenged a 1960 modification to the consent decree and sought
the right to intervene separately. The Supreme Court upheld the district court's refusal to
grant the right to intervene on the grounds that the smaller publishers were adequately repre-
sented by both the government and ASCAP. Id. at 695.
With regard to consent decrees, the Supreme Court traditionally recognized that the De-
partment of Justice is entitled to a certain amount of deference in its determinations. In the
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Following enactment of the APPA, the district courts retained the Sam
Fox Court's de minimis standard of review while also recognizing that the
Tunney Act imposes certain obligations on courts to reach independent eval-
uations. In United States v. Gillette Co.,19 Judge Aldrich of the United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts articulated a Tunney
Act public interest standard that bridges the two competing concerns.120
The Gillette court's standard, which is commonly cited in consent decree
cases, is a precursor to the D.C. Circuit's "zone of settlements" standard in
Western Electric.12 1 Specifically, the Gillette standard emphasizes that the
parties, and not the court, are settling the case. Though some consent de-
crees may not represent the optimal settlement, the Gillette standard re-
quires district courts only to ensure that the proposed settlement be "within
the reaches of the public interest."
' 122
According to two antitrust experts, the Gillette standard is an accurate
interpretation of the Tunney Act. 121 Post-APPA district courts rely signifi-
cantly on the Gillette court's standard of review under the Tunney Act.,
24
1928 Swift case, the meat-packers sought to vacate the decree, arguing, inter alia, that the
Attorney General exceeded his authority in negotiating a decree that placed broad restrictions
on the defendants. Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311, 331 (1928). The Court rejected
the defendants' claim, stating that the Attorney General's "authority to make determinations
includes the power to make erroneous decisions as well as correct ones." Id. at 332.
In reviewing proposed consent decrees prior to passage of the APPA, many district courts
followed the Supreme Court's admonition. See Control Data, 306 F. Supp. at 845 (stating that
"[t]he Attorney General is the representative of the public interest in antitrust cases brought
by the government"); United States v. Shubert, 305 F. Supp. 1288, 1292 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)
(arguing that the government, as opposed to the private litigant, is better equipped to serve the
public interest since the private litigant is likely to confuse the public interest with his or her
private interest); United States v. CIBA Corp., 1970 Trade Cas. (CCH) 73,319, at 89,262
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (recognizing that in considering proposed consent decrees, district courts
"must proceed in some degree upon faith in the competence and integrity of government
counsel").
119. 406 F. Supp. 713 (D. Mass. 1975).
120. Id. at 714-15.
121. See supra notes 104-11 and accompanying text.
122. Gillette, 406 F. Supp. at 716. The Gillette court ultimately approved a consent decree
that required Gillette to divest its domestic ownership of Braun, a manufacturer of electric
shavers, on the grounds that Gillette monopolized the dry shaving market. In approving the
decree, Judge Aldrich borrowed the Supreme Court's Sam Fox language in concluding that
"[w]ith regard to the government's good faith, I have not the slightest reason to suspect other-
wise. Nor has there been any contrary suggestion as a result of the proceeding's statutory
publicity." Id.
123. II AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 3, 330g.
124. See United States v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 29, 42 (W.D. Mo.
1975) (arguing that "a court's power to do very much about the terms of a particular decree,
even after it has given the decree maximum ...judicial scrutiny, is a decidedly limited
power"), aff'd, 534 F.2d 113 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976); United States v.
National Broadcasting Co., 449 F. Supp. 1127, 1143 (C.D. Cal. 1978) (stating that the court
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The Gillette standard enables a district court judge to conclude that a pro-
posed decree is rooted in the public interest, though it may not be "the best
possible settlement that could have been obtained."1 25 If the proposed de-
cree is conceivably within the reaches of the public interest, 126 then, as the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit argued, "[t]he balanc-
ing of competing social and political interests affected by a proposed anti-
trust consent decree must be left . . . to the discretion of the Attorney
General." 
127
In effect, the Gillette and Western Electric standards recognize that a vari-
ety of public policy options lies within the parameters established by anti-
trust law. Courts applying this type of standard consider public policy
choices to be within the province of the government and not the courts. 2 '
The AT&T decree court, however, viewed its role as questioning the govern-
ment's interpretations of not only antitrust law but also public policy
would "adhere[ ] to Judge Aldrich's sound advice"); United States v. Bechtel Corp., 648 F.2d
660 (9th Cir.) (citing with approval Gillette and National Broadcasting), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1083 (1981); United States v. Mid-America Dairymen, Inc., 1977-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
61,508, at 71,980 (W.D. Mo. 1977) (establishing that "[a]bsent a showing of corrupt failure of
the government to discharge its duty, the Court... should ... carefully consider the explana-
tions of the government ... to determine whether those explanations are reasonable under the
circumstances"); United States v. Agri-Mark, Inc., 512 F. Supp. 737, 739 (D. Vt. 1981) (stat-
ing that the district court's "function ... is not to determine whether this is the best possible
settlement that could have been obtained, but rather to determine whether the settlement
achieved is within the reaches of the public interest"); United States v. American Brands, Inc.,
1983-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,275, at 69,617 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (citing with approval Bechtel
and Agri-Mark); United States v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 662 F. Supp. 865, 869,
870 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (reasoning that in terminating a consent decree, which "is the same stan-
dard that a district court applies in deciding whether to enter [a proposed decree,] ... the
Court recognizes that the Department of Justice has broad discretion in controlling govern-
ment antitrust litigation").
125. Agri-Mark, 512 F. Supp. at 739.
126. Gillette, 406 F. Supp. at 716.
127. Bechtel, 648 F.2d at 666 (emphasis added). In Bechtel, the defendant was challenging
the entry of a consent decree due to certain events that occurred after both parties consented to
the decree. Bechtel argued, in part, that the district court had erred in its public interest
determination by refusing to consider "contentions going to the merits of the underlying
claims and defenses." Id The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected
Bechtel's claim, stating:
The court's role in protecting the public interest is one of insuring that the govern-
ment has not breached its duty to the public in consenting to the decree. The court is
required to determine not whether a particular decree is the one that will best serve
society, but whether the settlement is "within the reaches of the public interest."
Id. (quoting Gillette, 406 F. Supp. at 716). The Ninth Circuit later affirmed its interpretation
of the court's public interest determination in United States v. BNS, Inc., 858 F.2d 456, 462-63
(9th Cir. 1988).
128. Associated Milk Producers, 534 F.2d at 117 (stating that "[i]t is axiomatic that the
Attorney General must retain considerable discretion in controlling government litigation and
in determining what is in the public interest").
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choices.' 29 While interpreting antitrust law certainly is subject to de novo
review by any court, public policy decisions are properly left to the discre-
tion of the government. 3 '
II. THE AT&T DECREE COURT'S STANDARD OF REVIEW:
CONSTITUTIONAL AND PRACTICAL CONCERNS
The AT&T decree court offers several reasons to justify its demanding
standard of review.' First, the 1974 suit was "not an ordinary antitrust
case."' 32 The significance of the suit and the numerous parties that inter-
vened during both the original settlement and the 1987 modification pro-
ceeding led the court to believe that it "would be derelict in its duty if it
adopted a narrow approach to its public interest review responsibilities." '13 3
In addition, the court has argued on several occasions that since government
suits against AT&T had "an unfortunate history,"1 34 closer scrutiny is re-
quired than would be "in a more routine antitrust case."'13  The type of
129. In rejecting the idea that district courts should defer to the government's determina-
tions, the AT&T decree court argued that "courts must [not] unquestioningly accept a prof-
fered decree as long as it somehow, and however inadequately, deals with the antitrust and
other public policy problems implicated in the lawsuit." United States v. American Tel. & Tel.
Co. (AT&T), 552 F. Supp. 131, 151 (D.D.C. 1982) (emphasis added), aff'd sub nom. Mary-
land v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
130. Bechtel, 648 F.2d at 666.
131. In considering both the proposed decree and its subsequent modifications, the AT&T
decree court has required the parties to show that "there is no substantial possibility that [the
RBOCs] could use [their] monopoly power to impede competition." AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at
231; United States v. Western Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525, 532 (D.D.C. 1987), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part, 900 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 283 (1990).
The court emphasizes the same concerns when addressing either the proposed decree in
1982 or subsequent modifications in 1987. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 135-40, 151-53, 216; West-
ern Elec., 673 F. Supp. at 529-32, 600-04. Though this Comment addresses proceedings in-
volving uncontested modifications, it nonetheless will assume that the court's concerns raised
in the 1982 proceeding apply to the 1987 modification proceeding and therefore will discuss
those concerns in the context of analyzing proposed modifications.
132. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 151.
133. Id. at 152.
134. Id. The court was referring to the alleged improprieties that took place during the
government's suit against AT&T that began in 1949 and concluded with the 1956 consent
decree.
135. Id. at 153. At the triennial review, the AT&T decree court, referring to the govern-
ment decision to settle the 1949 suit, stated that "[t]hat history must not be repeated. This
Court cannot and will not lend its authority to so self-defeating an enterprise." Western Elec.,
673 F. Supp. at 602.
A third justification the court offered was that since it had heard approximately 90 percent
of the parties' evidence, it was better equipped than most courts to evaluate the specifics and
validity of the consent decree. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 152. In fact, while considering MFJ-
related legislation, Congress has relied on the AT&T decree court's knowledge of and familiar-
ity with the decree. Specifically, Senator Simon wrote Judge Greene soliciting his views re-
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review exercised by the court raises important constitutional and practical
concerns that highlight the need for a regular and uniform standard of re-
view for uncontested modifications.
A. The Sliding Scale Approach to Reviewing Uncontested Modifications
The AT&T decree court's standard of review, in effect, would create a
"sliding scale" for judicial review of both entry of and modifications to de-
crees.' 36 Under a sliding scale approach, the level of judicial scrutiny pre-
sumably would increase with the more significant modification proposals.
The sliding scale approach, however, has two problems.
First, the court's assertion that the significance of the case justifies strict
scrutiny is not consistent with the legislative history of the APPA. 37 Dur-
ing Senate hearings on the APPA, the bill's sponsor explored whether "it
might be advisable to introduce a trigger in the bill so that its provisions...
would be applicable only in important cases."' 38 Congress ultimately rejected
a trigger provision.' 39 While the AT&T decree court is correct that Con-
gress enacted the APPA to correct the problem of "judicial rubber stamp-
ing,"'"' Congress did not endorse a sliding scale-type model.
Second, the sliding scale approach suffers from ambiguity. If judicial
scrutiny should increase with the significance of the proposed modification,
district courts would be left to determine which modifications are "signifi-
cant." As a result, a wide range of interpretations of "significant" modifica-
tions would surface. Congress indicated that making "significance" the
touchstone in approving proposed consent decrees would present pro-
garding a Senate bill, S. 173, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), to relieve the BOCs from the MFJ's
manufacturing restrictions. Letter from Paul Simon, U.S. Senator, U.S. Senate, to Harold H.
Greene, U.S. District Court Judge, U.S. District Court for the District of the District of Co-
lumbia (May 21, 1991) (on file with the Catholic University Law Review). Judge Greene re-
sponded by "calling [Senator Simon's] attention to pertinent parts of published opinions" by
the AT&T decree court. Letter from Harold H. Greene, U.S. District Court Judge, U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the District of the District of Columbia, to Paul Simon, U.S. Senator, U.S.
Senate (May 29, 1991) (on file with the Catholic University Law Review).
136. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 231.
137. See generally HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3; SENATE REPORT, supra note 24.
138. Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 6 (statement of Sen. Tunney) (emphasis added).
139. As one commentator has noted, "[t]he legislative history ... reveals that Congress
rejected several proposals that the APPA contain a trigger mechanism and thus apply only to
'important' cases." James C. Noonan, Note, Judicial Review of Antitrust Consent Decrees:
Reconciling Judicial Responsibility With Executive Discretion, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 133, 155
(1983).
140. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 8.
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blems.' 4 ' Similar interpretative problems could arise in modification pro-
ceedings. While the parties to the decree might regard a modification as
technical, the court, or even a third party, might interpret the modification
as "significant" enough to warrant intense scrutiny and rejection by the
court. Ultimately, ambiguity surrounding the sliding scale approach would
conflict with Congress' intention to "regularize and make uniform" the con-
sent decree process. 142
B. Defining Bad Faith
The AT&T decree court has frequently mentioned that government anti-
trust suits against AT&T involve alleged improprieties.14 Most pre-APPA
and post-APPA district courts view their primary role in considering modifi-
cations to consent decrees as ensuring that the process is free of malfeasance
and collusion. 1" In Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, 4 ' a case
which was decided prior to passage of the APPA, the Supreme Court di-
rected district courts to limit their consideration of proposed consent decrees
to "claim[s] of bad faith or malfeasance on the part of the Government.'
46
In effect, the Tunney Act's concern that "antitrust violators.., often bring
significant pressure to bear on government"'147 codifies the duty the Supreme
Court imposed on district courts in Sam Fox. Thus, the district courts'
"public interest" determination,148 at the very least, includes considering
whether the government has acted in "bad faith."
The AT&T decree court concluded that the AT&T case's "unfortunate
history" amounts to the type of bad faith and malfeasance the Tunney Act
141. During Senate hearings on the proposed legislation, Senator Tunney admitted that
even if a "trigger" mechanism was included, he was unsure "how [Congress] would define an
important case." Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 6.
142. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 7.
143. At the settlement proceeding, the AT&T decree court decided that the parties' con-
duct did "not foster a sense of confidence that the assessment of the settlement and its implica-
tions may be left entirely to AT&T and the Department of Justice." United States v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co. (AT&T), 552 F. Supp. 131, 153 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub noma.
Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). At the triennial review, the court expressed
similar skepticism about the parties' intentions when it stated that it would avoid repeating the
same mistakes made during the 1949 case, which led to the 1956 Western Electric consent
decree. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525, 602 (D.D.C. 1987), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part, 900 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 283 (1990).
144. Congress' concern with alleged improprieties involving the entry of several consent
decrees was the motivating force in passing the Tunney Act. See supra notes 25-37 and accom-
panying text.
145. 366 U.S. 683 (1961).
146. Id. at 689.
147. SENATE REPORT, supra note 24, at 5.
148. 15 U.S.C. § 16(e)-(f) (1988).
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cautions against. 149 The court was referring to the circumstances surround-
ing the government's 1949 case against AT&T.'5 ° However, while correctly
noting that "identical parties," i.e., the government and AT&T, were in-
volved in both 1949 and 1982, the court unfairly assumed that improprieties
that were committed in one case must have been committed again thirty-
three years later. At a minimum, the turnover in personnel, both in the
Antitrust Division and at AT&T, over the course of thirty-three years' 5 '
should create a presumption that the parties did not engage in the same
collusive behavior.
Aside from the alleged improprieties dating back to the 1949 case, the
AT&T decree court implied that the parties to the 1982 case engaged in
improprieties of their own.152 The court faulted the government and AT&T
for originally attempting to settle the case in the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey'.. since "that proposal might either have es-
caped Tunney Act review altogether or it might at best have been reviewed
only to the extent agreeable to them." 5 4 While the court believed that this
amounts to the type of "bad faith" that warrants increased judicial scrutiny
of the consent decree and subsequent modifications, the parties' efforts were
wholly consistent with statutory and case law.'" At that time, the parties
believed that since the settlement would be a modification to the 1956 con-
sent decree, the Tunney Act did not apply.15 6  If anything, the parties
demonstrated their "good faith" when they stipulated to the AT&T decree
court that they would comply with the spirit of the APPA though they be-
lieved it did not apply.157
149. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co. (AT&T), 552 F. Supp. 131, 152 (D.D.C.
1982), aff'd sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
150. Id at 135-38.
151. Since 1949, the year the Department of Justice first sued AT&T, 19 persons have
served as Attorney General. During the same period, 20 persons have served as Assistant
Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division at the Department of Justice. In 1985,
the Antitrust Division created the Communications and Finance Section, which, inter alia, is
responsible for administering the AT&T consent decree. Three persons have headed the Com-
munications and Finance Section since its establishment.
152. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 152-53.
153. See supra note 60.
154. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 152 n.91.
155. See supra notes 49-63 and accompanying text.
156. See supra note 60.
157. The court also made reference to "inappropriate collaboration" between the Depart-
ment of Defense and AT&T that it believed resembled the collaboration between the same two
entities that took place during the 1949 case. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 153.
A second indication of the government's "good faith" can be inferred from the court's insis-
tence that the proposed decree be modified to remove two restrictions that had been imposed
on BOCs. Specifically, the proposed decree would have prohibited BOCs from marketing cus-
tomer premises equipment, such as telephones, and producing directory advertising manuals,
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Thus, although the court implied that the government's conduct since
1982 amounts to the bad faith that the Sam Fox Court and Congress cau-
tioned against, the implication is unrealistic. The court's response to the
government's conduct suggests that it believed the government was more
guilty of incompetence than of bad faith or malfeasance. 58 In particular,
the court stated that "[t]hese circumstances do not foster a sense of confi-
dence that the assessment of the settlement and its implications may be left
entirely to AT&T and the Department of Justice."15 9 The court's private
opinion regarding the parties' degree of precision should not supersede its
obligation to grant uncontested modifications that serve the public
interest.'6°
C. Constitutional and Practical Concerns Arising Out of the AT&T
Decree Court's Standard of Review
The AT&T decree court's unwillingness to defer to the government's pub-
lic interest determinations raises two specific concerns, one constitutional
and the other practical. In the absence of procedural and substantive uni-
formity in reviewing uncontested modifications, these concerns may ulti-
mately jeopardize the usefulness of consent decrees. Such a result would be
contrary to the express policy goals of Congress.
16 1
commonly known as Yellow Pages. l at 191-94. The AT&T decree court concluded that
BOCs would not "be able to use their monopoly position to disadvantage competitors" and
required the parties to remove the two restrictions as a condition for entering the decree. Id at
224.
Thus, while the court is concerned that the parties may have engaged in collusive activities,
thereby implying that the government may have negotiated far less relief than would have been
obtained at trial, the court's requirement that the proposed decree be modified to remove re-
strictions suggests that the court was concerned that the government had negotiated too much
relief. See Note, The Scope of Judicial Review of Consent Decrees Under the Antitrust Poce-
dures and Penalties Act of 1974, 82 MICH. L. REv. 153, 160 n.49 (1983). The court's action
belies its concern that the Department of Justice and AT&T colluded to evade judicial relief
for the corporation. The court's required modifications suggest the opposite: the government
independently crafted a solution that the court believed was excessive.
158. "Bad faith" is defined as "[t]he opposite of 'good faith,' generally implying or involv-
ing actual or constructive fraud." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 139 (6th ed. 1990). "Malfea-
sance" is defined as "[e]vil doing; ill conduct. The commission of some act which is positively
unlawful." Id. at 956.
159. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 153 (emphasis added).
160. One commentator argued that AT&T's correspondence with the Department of De-
fense in the 1974 case and the parties' decision to settle the case in New Jersey "provide no
compelling analytical justification for the creation of the formidable review test formulated by
the AT&T court." Noonan, supra note 139, at 155.
161. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 6; SENATE REPORT, supra note 24, at 5-6.
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1. Separation of Powers Considerations
In Maryland v. United States,162 the Supreme Court summarily affirmed
the AT&T decree court's entry of the settlement. 163 The case consolidated
four appeals challenging various substantive aspects of the decree.64 Con-
trary to some assertions, 6 5 however, the appeals did not challenge the con-
stitutionality of either the APPA itself or the AT&T decree court's standard
of review under the APPA. Public officials
166 and private commentators 67
alike have argued that a district court's public interest determination under
the APPA presents possible separation of powers problems.
In Green v. Frazier,61 the Supreme Court established that "courts have no
general authority of supervision over the exercise of discretion which under
our system is reposed in the ... other departments of government."'169 With
regard to judicial approval of consent decrees and subsequent modifica-
162. 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
163. Id The Court heard the case on direct appeal from the district court pursuant to the
Expediting Act. Id. at 1002. Under the Expediting Act, parties may appeal the entry of a
consent decree directly to the Supreme Court upon certification by the district court. 15
U.S.C. § 29(b) (1988).
164. In Maryland v. United States, No. 82-952, and Illinois v. United States, No. 82-1001,
several states challenged the federal government's authority to preempt state regulation pursu-
ant to the decree. Maryland, 460 U.S. at 1002 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In Tandy Corp. v.
United States, No. 82-953, the Tandy Corporation challenged the decree's elimination of "a
requirement that Western Electric license its patents for a reasonable royalty to anyone who
applies." Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Finally, in North Am. Tel. Assn. v. United States, No.
82-992, an organization of telecommunications manufacturers objected to the MFJ provision
allowing BOCs to market customer premises equipment. Id. at 1003 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
165. See Note, supra note 157, at 168 n.98 (arguing that the Supreme Court's summary
affirmance of AT&T demonstrates the constitutionality of the APPA's public interest
provision).
166. In his additional views to the House Report accompanying the APPA, Representative
Hutchinson wrote that "[i]f it is assumed that it is necessary for someone to review the Depart-
ment's exercise of prosecutorial discretion to determine whether it is in the public interest, it
does not follow that the federal courts, limited by the Constitution to deciding judicial ques-
tions, are the appropriate reviewing agencies." HouSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 22; see also
Maryland, 460 U.S. at 1001-06 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
167. In 1983, the Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the Department of Justice Anti-
trust Division during the AT&T litigation voiced his concern that "in some particulars, the
judgments that were reached may have gone beyond at least the traditional understanding of
the public interest standard, in ways that may even begin to call into play separation of powers
principles." Ronald G. Carr, Some Observations on the Tunney Act, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 953,
961 (1983). Despite his concerns with Judge Greene's exacting review, Mr. Carr believes that
the court "ably conducted" the Tunney Act proceedings. Id.; see also Noonan, supra note 139,
at 157 n.179; Anderson, supra note 9, at 149-50.
168. 253 U.S. 233 (1920).
169. Id. at 240.
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tions,7 ° the Green standard does not require district courts to blindly
approve proposed modifications. Proposed modifications are similar to pro-
posed decrees and thus represent "judicial acts''7 subject to approval of
district courts. The Green separation of powers standard, however, limits
courts to determining whether the proposed modification is consistent with
existing antitrust laws; policy decisions reside within another branch of the
government.
The AT&T decree court's rigorous standard of review of the uncontested
modification amounts to the type of encroachment that the Green Court cau-
tioned against. 172 The court used the same standard in reviewing the pro-
posed modifications that it used in considering the proposed decree. 173 In
his dissent to the Maryland Court's summary affirmance, Justice Rehnquist
argued that the AT&T decree court's standard of review fails to "admit[ ] of
resolution by a court exercising the judicial power established by Art[icle]
III of the Constitution."' 7 4 Given that district courts operate without statu-
tory authority in modification proceedings,'"7 Justice Rehnquist's concerns
are directly applicable to such proceedings. The decision to enter into a de-
170. Arguably, the Maryland Court may have chosen not to invalidate the judiciary's pub-
lic interest determination under the APPA because the statute mandates such a determination.
See 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)-(h) (1988). In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579
(1952), Justice Jackson wrote in his concurring opinion that the executive branch's authority is
at its "maximum" when it operates pursuant to a legislative mandate. Id. at 635-37 (Jackson,
J., concurring). By analogy, the judiciary's authority is perhaps at its "maximum" when it
operates pursuant to a legislative mandate. Thus, given that district courts' public interest
determinations during settlement proceedings are made pursuant to the Tunney Act, their
findings may withstand a constitutional challenge. District courts' findings during modifica-
tion proceedings, however, are arguably less supportable because the APPA does not apply.
See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
171. United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 115 (1932).
172. In reversing the AT&T decree court's decision not to lift the information services
restriction, the D.C. Circuit did not address the separation of powers issue. Instead, the ap-
peals court limited its reversal to the issue of the appropriate standard of review. United States
v. Western Elec. Co., 900 F.2d 283, 293 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 283
(1990).
173. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525, 532-36, 600-02 (D.D.C. 1987),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 900 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
283 (1990).
174. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001, 1004 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In
addition to his concerns with the AT&T court's stringent standard, Justice Rehnquist argued
that a district court's public interest determination under the APPA, regardless of how defer-
ential that determination may be, "is a classic example of a question committed to the Execu-
tive," id. at 1005 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), in this case the Department of Justice. Thus, the
possibility exists that should the APPA be challenged as facially unconstitutional, the Supreme
Court could strike it down. Justice Rehnquist was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice
White in his Maryland dissent. Id. at 1001.
175. See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
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cree entails a policy decision over "whether the benefits that might be ob-
tained in a lawsuit are worth the risks and costs. '' 17 6 Similarly, the decision
to modify a decree is a policy decision that entitles the government to judi-
cial deference.
2. Practical Considerations: Preserving Consent Decrees as an
Alternative to Litigation
The second concern with the AT&T decree court's lack of deference to-
wards the Department of Justice is a practical one: it jeopardizes the attrac-
tiveness of settlement by consent decree for both the government and
defendants. 77 Both the government and defendants may be disinclined to
craft consent decrees if they believe that the public interest determinations
made by the government will be replaced by those of district courts. How-
ever, in passing the Tunney Act, Congress endorsed the opposite result:, to
"preserve the consent decree as a viable settlement option."178  District
courts have been cognizant of Congressional intent to preserve consent de-
crees as a viable alternative to litigation.'
79
When the APPA was enacted, one commentator cautioned that Congress,
in passing the APPA, had "established an elaborate procedure which will
prove counterproductive and may, indeed, undermine effective enforcement
of our antitrust laws."' 80 Those concerns have not been borne out"8 ' be-
176. Maryland, 460 U.S. at 1006 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
177. The AT&T decree court's active supervision of the approval and subsequent adminis-
tration of the decree has led one commentator to conclude that the court's standard "injects a
substantial degree of uncertainty into the consent decree process" since "[t]he distinct possibil-
ity that any terms agreed to by the parties might be altered by the reviewing court could place
a significant strain on the negotiations." Noonan, supra note 139, at 156.
178. SENATE REPORT, supra note 24, at 6. In its report, the House stated that the Tunney
Act was intended to preserve the overall goal of the consent decree program: encourage settle-
ment of antitrust suits. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 6.
179. "[The court is adjured to adopt 'the least complicated and least time-consuming
means possible.'" United States v. Gillette Co., 406 F. Supp. 713, 715 (D. Mass. 1975) (quot-
ing SENATE REPORT, supra note 24, at 6); see also United States v. Bechtel Corp., 648 F.2d
660, 666 (9th Cir.) (stressing that "[m]ore elaborate requirements [than those established by
the Gillette court] might undermine the effectiveness of antitrust enforcement by consent de-
cree"), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1083 (1981); United States v. Mid-America Dairymen, Inc.,
1977-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) $ 61,508, at 71,980 (W.D. Mo. 1977) (stating that "[i]t was the
intention of Congress in enacting APPA to preserve consent decrees as a viable enforcement
option in antitrust cases").
180. Milton Handler, Antitrust-Myth and Reality in an Inflationary Era, 50 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 211, 243 (1975).
181. McDavid et al., supra note 31, at 915 (concluding that "[t]here is little evidence that
Tunney Act procedures have been abused or have imposed undue burdens on the parties").
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cause district courts have taken a restrictive view of their role,18 2 particu-
larly in cases involving uncontested modifications to consent decrees."8 a The
D.C. Circuit reinforced that consensus in its remand of the AT&T decree
court's opinion.'8 4 The D.C. Circuit emphasized that the government's pub-
lic interest determinations are entitled to some deference. ' 8 5 In reversing the
district court's denial of the uncontested modification, the D.C. Circuit ar-
gued that "it is to be expected that the district court would seriously con-
sider the Department [of Justice's] economic analysis and predictions of
market behavior"' 86 given the Department's "comparative advantage" in as-
sessing the state of competition in the relevant market.'8 7
Prior to being reversed by the D.C. Circuit, the AT&T decree court
viewed the APPA as an absolute rejection of the Sam Fox standard,
1 88
which would mean that district courts should accord the Department of Jus-
182. In one case, the district court implied that the APPA provides courts with a limited
function in approving consent decrees. The court stated that:
if the Congress wants the judicial branch to have more power than that implicit in a
threat of total rejection of a proposed decree, such power must be authorized by legis-
lation which is considerably broader in scope than that vested by the newly enacted
Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act or by existing law.
United States v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 29, 42 (W.D. Mo. 1975) (em-
phasis added), aff'd, 534 F.2d 113 (8th Cir. 1976).
183. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
184. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 900 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. de-
nied, 111 S. Ct. 283 (1990). The D.C. Circuit in Western Electric discussed the judicial defer-
ence issue in the context of defining the proper standard of review under section VIII(C) of the
MFJ, which, according to the D.C. Circuit, is the equivalent of the Swift standard for contested
modifications to the MFJ. Id at 295. Given that the section VII standard, which the D.C.
Circuit argued is to be used for uncontested modifications, is much less stringent, one can
reasonably infer that district courts are expected to defer to the Department of Justice when
using this standard.
On remand, the AT&T decree court appeared to draw this inference in deciding to lift the
information services restriction pursuant to the D.C. Circuit's standard of review. The district
court stated that "this Court is required to defer to the Department of Justice on the issue of
whether the proposed modification of the decree is in the public interest as that term is used in
the Tunney Act." United States v. Western Elec. Co., 767 F. Supp. 308, 329 (D.D.C. 1991).
185. Western Elec., 900 F.2d at 297-98.
186. Id. at 297.
187. Id at 298.
188. "Congress rejected case law to the effect that courts should not 'assess the wisdom of
the Government's judgment in negotiating and accepting [a] consent decree.'" United States
v. American Tel. & Tel. Co. (AT&T), 552 F. Supp. 131, 149 n.74 (D.D.C. 1982) (alteration in
original), aff'd sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983) (quoting Sam Fox
Publishing Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683, 689 (1961)). Contra United States v. Mid-
America Dairymen, Inc., 1977-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 61,508, at 71,979-80 (W.D. Mo. 1977)
(stating that "[t]he APPA did not change the pre-existing standards for determining whether
entry of an antitrust consent decree is in the public interest" and that "[t]he APPA codifies the
case law which established that the Department of Justice has a range of discretion in deciding
the terms upon which an antitrust case will be settled").
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tice a minimal amount of deference." s9 Instead, the AT&T decree court ar-
gued that the heightened standard of review required by the APPA is based
on "the line of cases in which courts examined proposed consent decrees to
determine whether they were in the public interest."'"
In terms of prior case law, however, Congress indicated 9 . that it was
endorsing the approach taken by the Supreme Court in United States v. Ar-
mour & Co., 92 where the Supreme Court emphasized that consent decrees
should be viewed as "a compromise; in exchange for the saving of cost and
elimination of risk, the parties each give up something they might have won
had they proceeded with the litigation." '93
189. Compare Note, supra note 157, at 165-70 (arguing that a district court applying the
APPA would be abdicating its responsibility if it relied on the Sam Fox standard) and Michael
J. Zimmer & Charles A. Sullivan, Consent Decree Settlements by Administrative Agencies in
Antitrust and Employment Discrimination:L Optimizing Public and Private Interests, 1976 DUKE
L.J. 163, 206-10 (arguing that the APPA requires district courts to abandon the pre-APPA
standard of judicial deference) with Noonan, supra note 139, at 151 n.143 (asserting that
"[w]hile the spirit of the APPA lends some credence to these arguments [that Congress en-
dorsed a heightened standard of review], Congress explicitly directed the courts to adhere to
pre-APPA precedent when defining the 'public interest' ").
190. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 149 n.74. The court cited United States v. Carter Prods., Inc.,
211 F. Supp. 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), and United States v. Ling-Temco-Vought (LTV), Inc., 315
F. Supp. 1301 (W.D. Pa. 1970), as "the line of cases" that Congress viewed as embodying the
heightened public interest standard in the APPA. However, the court's conclusion is puzzling
since the Carter Products and LTV courts demonstrated significantly more deference towards
the government than the AT&T court did. In Carter Products, the court approved a consent
decree between the government and Carter Products which broke Carter Products' control
over the market for a widely distributed drug called meprobamate compound, the sole active
ingredient in tranquilizing drugs. Carter Products, 211 F. Supp. at 146-49. The court, relying
on the government's "weighty considerations," id. at 148, concluded that the proposed decree
was in the public interest since the settlement afforded "substantially the same relief that could
be obtained after a hearing upon the merits" and also preserved a third party's right to litigate
the validity of the decree. Id
In LTV, the government and LTV entered into a consent decree which required LTV to
divest its ownership of Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation (J&L). LTV, 315 F. Supp. at 1302-
08. The court had received letters during settlement proceedings "expressing deep concern"
over the impact the decree would have on pension and employee plans then operated by J&L.
Id. at 1309. As a condition for entering the decree, the court instructed the parties to include
in the decree a provision to safeguard J&L's existing pension and employee plans. Id. at 1310.
Though LTV is commonly cited as a case demonstrating heightened judicial scrutiny, the
court emphasized that it was deferring to the parties determinations, "particularly the assur-
ance of the Department of Justice." Id. at 1309 (emphasis added).
191. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 8-9 (citing United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S.
673 (1971)).
192. 402 U.S. 673 (1971).
193. Id. at 681; accord United States v. Mid-America Dairymen, Inc., 1977-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 1 61,508, at 71,980 (W.D. Mo. 1977) (arguing that "[t]he Court must also give appro-
priate recognition ... to the fact that every consent judgment normally embodies a compro-
mise"). But see McDavid et al., supra note 31, at 891-95. The authors argue that the court's
public interest determination under the APPA is based on cases where courts engaged in a
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The element of "compromise" stressed by the Supreme Court in Armour
is codified in the APPA. 194 While consent decrees are "judicial acts" that
require a court's approval, they also represent a contractual settlement be-
tween two parties. District courts that substitute their own views on appro-
priate public policy run the risk of upsetting that settlement. The Supreme
Court, in Armour, and Congress, in passing the APPA, have encouraged
courts in reviewing proposed decrees to recognize that decrees embody a
settlement between two parties. District courts considering proposed de-
crees have heeded the encouragement by deferring to the parties' decisions to
enter into consent decrees.1 95 Likewise, in uncontested modification pro-
ceedings, courts have demonstrated the same type of deference. 196 Though
the Armour Court's and Congress' admonitions apply specifically to pro-
posed decrees, the courts have recognized that proposed modifications repre-
sent a refinement of the prior settlement.
III. A PROPOSED STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR UNCONTESTED
MODIFICATIONS
Because neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has addressed the issue
of uncontested modifications,197 the district courts need guidance as to the
proper standard of review for such cases. Although only one district court,
the AT&T decree court, has denied an uncontested modification, the issue
should still be addressed. Other district courts in the future will be con-
fronted with the issue.
thorough public interest inquiry. They also argue that "Judge Greene's inquiry into the A T& T
decree was no more rigorous than that conducted by the courts in some cases prior to enact-
ment of the Tunney Act. AT&T is simply the most recent, best-publicized consent decree
proceeding." Id. at 894.
194. To preserve the spirit of compromise, Congress urged the district courts in reviewing
proposed consent decrees to "adduce the necessary information through the least complicated
and least time-consuming means possible." SENATE REPORT, supra note 24, at 6. Congress
seemed to be echoing the Armour Court's observation that district courts should recognize that
the proposed consent decree is a form of settlement, whereby both parties are foregoing the
possibility that "they might have won had they proceeded with the litigation." Armour, 402
U.S. at 681.
195. See supra notes 116-30 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
197. In 1982, Congress considered, but failed to enact, legislation to extend the Tunney Act
to both modification and dismissal proceedings. See H.R. 6361, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982);
see also The Tunney Act: Oversight Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commer-
cial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
19921
Catholic University Law Review
Many district courts 9 ' have relied on the Tunney Act for guidance in
uncontested modifications.'99 The courts' reliance is logical since proceed-
ings involving uncontested modifications are practically identical to proceed-
ings involving proposed consent decrees: both parties are in agreement and
seek the court's approval.2°° Thus, the concerns that Congress expressed in
passing the Tunney Act apply to uncontested modifications. Congress was
concerned that judicial "rubber stamping" 20' would result in consent de-
crees that were not in the public interest.202
Congress' response to these problems was "to regularize and make uni-
form judicial and public procedures that depend upon the Justice Depart-
ment's decision to enter into a proposal for a consent decree. 2 3 The same
type of procedural and substantive regularity and uniformity would be ad-
vantageous in uncontested modification proceedings. Thus, in the absence of
a legislative mandate from Congress, the courts should apply a "zone of
settlements" standard that borrows significantly from the APPA procedural
and substantive requirements currently being applied by many district courts
in reviewing proposed decrees.2°
A. Zone of Settlements Procedural and Substantive Requirements:
Differentiating Between Legal Interpretations and Policy
Decisions
In considering uncontested proposals to modify an existing consent de-
cree, district courts should adopt the procedures of the Tunney Act.205 A
competitive impact statement, similar to that required by section 1(a) of the
Tunney Act,2°' would require the Department of Justice to explain its con-
sent to a proposed modification, thereby aiding the court in making its deter-
198. See supra notes 55-67 and accompanying text.
199. In fact, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit suggested that
district courts rely on the Tunney Act when considering modifications to existing consent
decrees. United States v. American Cyanamid Co., 719 F.2d 558, 565 n.7 (2d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1101 (1984).
200. Aside from having to apply the Swift standard in contested modifications, the court
also will have the benefit of controversy between the parties to assist the court in its determina-
tion. Therefore, the differences in opinion presented to the court obviate the need for APPA-
type procedures.
201. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 8.
202. See generally House Hearings, supra note 35, at 35-37 (statement of Rep. Rodino);
Senate Hearings, supra note 37, at 2-4 (statement of Sen. Tunney).
203. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 7.
204. See supra notes 55-67 and accompanying text.
205. See 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)-(d) (1988).
206. Id. § 16(b).
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mination. In addition, the APPA's notice and comment requirements2 °7
serve as sufficient notice to third parties who may contest the modifications.
Though many uncontested modifications are technical, asking the parties to
comply would not act as a disincentive."20 Instead, technical modifications
would require less of the court's time and resources in making its de-
terminations.20 9
Just as parties should procedurally comply with the Tunney Act, the
court also should comply with the statute's substantive requirements. In
particular, the court's standard of review for uncontested modifications
should be the same as for proposed consent decrees.210 The public interest
standard in the Tunney Act does not entitle the district court "to substitute
its judgment about the advisability of settlement by consent judgment in lieu
of trial."21 1 Rather, the district court should review the modification in
terms of whether it "is within the reaches of the public interest.
212
207. Id § 16(c), (d).
208. A former attorney in the Department of Justice's Antitrust Division during the AT&T
case stated that:
With respect to modifications, the Department's point is a narrow one, and concerns
not principle, but practicality. There is no possible objection to the requirement that
the Department explain the reasons for its proposal. In moving the court for modifi-
cation, the Department invariably does, and must do, exactly that. There is no objec-
tion to the defendant having to expose its contacts with the government.
Carr, supra note 167, at 954.
209. In fact, asking the parties to comply would act as an effective means of "smoking out"
possible bad faith or malfeasance. If the parties decline to comply, then the court could infer
that the parties are possibly withholding information that would be pertinent to making a
public interest determination. United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 115 (1932).
210. "[U]ncontested motions for modification ... should be approved so long as the modi-
fications satisfy the 'public interest' standard embodied in the Tunney Act." United States v.
Western Elec. Co., 900 F.2d 283, 295 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 283
(1990).
211. United States v. Mid-America Dairymen, Inc., 1977-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) $ 61,508, at
71,979 (W.D. Mo. 1977); accord United States v. Bechtel Corp., 648 F.2d 660, 666 (9th Cir.)
(reasoning that "[t]he court is required to determine not whether a particular decree is the one
that will best serve society"), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1083 (1981); United States v. Agri-Mark,
Inc., 512 F. Supp. 737, 739 (D. Vt. 1981) (stating that the court's "function [in approving
consent decrees] is not to determine whether this is the best possible settlement"); United
States v. American Brands, Inc., 1983-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,275, at 69,617 (S.D.N.Y.
1983) (determining that "[t]he court's function in making a public interest determination
under the APPA is not to determine whether [the proposed settlement] is the best possible
settlement"); United States v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 662 F. Supp. 865, 870
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (stating that in terminating a consent decree, which involves the same stan-
dard of review in approving a consent decree, the court "'may not substitute its opinion or
views concerning ... the determination of appropriate injunctive relief for the settlement of
[antitrust] cases' ") (quoting Mid-America Dairymen, 1977-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 71,980).
212. United States v. Gillette Co., 406 F. Supp. 713, 716 (D. Mass. 1975); accord Bechtel,
648 F.2d at 666 (arguing that "[tihe court is required to determine ... whether the settlement
is 'within the reaches of the public interest' ") (quoting Gillette, 406 F. Supp. at 716); United
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Therefore, in uncontested modification proceedings, the government's de-
cision to enter into a modification of the decree should carry the presump-
tion that the modification is in the public interest. Since the Tunney Act did
not overrule traditional judicial deference towards the government's deci-
sions to enter into consent decrees,21 a the same type of deference should
apply to uncontested modification proceedings.
The court may rebut the presumption in two ways. First, the court can
rely on the traditional Sam Fox standard and reject a proposed modification
if the proposal is the product of bad faith or malfeasance. 214 Second, the
court can reject the proposed modification if it determines that the modifica-
tion is outside the parameters of conceivable public policy decisions. 215 This
is equivalent to the D.C. Circuit's "zone of settlements" standard216 and the
Gillette court's standard that the proposed decree be "within the reaches of
the public interest., 211 Under this standard, the district court is not permit-
ted to substitute its own view as to the most appropriate settlement. Rather,
the government's proposal amounts to a legitimate policy decision and not a
breach of existing antitrust law, the court is obligated to accept that propo-
sal. In doing so, the district court avoids possible separation of powers con-
cerns and best preserves the viability of the consent decree process.
B Usefulness of the Zone of Settlements Standard
The "zone of settlements" standard is appropriate for several reasons.
First, it provides the procedural uniformity necessary to ensure that consent
decrees are in the public interest.218 Second, its substantive requirements
significantly reduce the possibility of constitutional challenges. Unlike court
determinations in settlement proceedings, the court's public interest assess-
ments in uncontested modification proceedings are not made pursuant to a
statute.219 Thus, the court's standard of review should be confined to a con-
ventional, Article III public interest determination. 220 This prevents the
possibility that the court's determination would be deemed unconstitu-
States v. National Broadcasting Co., 449 F. Supp. 1127, 1143 (C.D. Cal. 1978) (agreeing with
the standard articulated by the Gillette court).
213. See supra notes 180-96 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 143-60 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 119-30 and accompanying text.
216. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 900 F.2d 283, 307 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 283 (1990).
217. United States v. Gillette Co., 406 F. Supp. 713, 716 (D. Mass. 1975).
218. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 6; SENATE REPORT, supra note 24, at 5.
219. See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text; see also supra note 170.
220. See supra notes 68-80 and accompanying text; see also Maryland v. United States, 460
U.S. 1001, 1004 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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tional.221 Moreover, the "zone of settlements" standard provides more reso-
lution than the AT&T decree court's more stringent standard because it
recognizes that a district court cannot replace the government's policy deci-
sions with its own preferred solution.
Third, the "zone of settlements" standard preserves the government's abil-
ity to make policy decisions as it sees fit. The AT&T decree court noted at
the triennial review that, over the course of five years, the government re-
versed its position 222 on the lines of business restrictions even though "no
significant changes" had occurred in those markets to warrant the govern-
ment's policy reversal.223 However, the Tunney Act's (and the "zone of set-
tlement's") public interest standard does not forbid policy reversals.224 The
standard only requires that the government's decisions be conceivably
rooted in the public interest.225 If district courts substitute their own judg-
221. Green v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 233, 240 (1920) (establishing that "questions of policy" are
not to be decided by the judiciary).
222. At the time the decree was entered in 1982, the Department of Justice had recom-
mended that BOCs be prohibited from entering the long distance, manufacturing, and infor-
mation services markets. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co. (AT&T), 552 F. Supp.
131, 186-191 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub nomL Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
At the triennial review in 1987, the government recommended that the MFJ restrictions on
BOCs entering the manufacturing and information services markets be lifted. United States v.
Western Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525, 552-67 (D.D.C. 1987), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 900
F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 11 S. Ct. 283 (1990). As for the long distance
restriction, the government originally supported lifting it but then decided to oppose lifting the
restriction. Id, at 540-52; see also supra note 96.
223. Western Elec., 673 F. Supp. at 602.
224. In a 1989 interview, Judge Greene indicated he was dissatisfied with the government's
policy reversal. He stated:
[A]ntitrust decrees are not written, unlike leases for apartments, on a month-to-
month basis. They are written for a long, long time, typically, particularly a big
decree like this. And then to come along and say, a couple of years later, "Oops, we
made a mistake; let's forget about it," it's obviously a change in policy. Now what
brought it about and who brought it about, I don't know. But I'm hopeful that we'll
get back on a more even keel now.
Margaret E. Kriz, Ringing the Bells, 21 NAT'L J. 272, 274 (1989).
225. While the AT&T decree court viewed the government's policy reversal as contrary to
the public interest, it is consistent with the trend in Congress towards lifting the MFJ restric-
tions. In a recent article covering legislative proposals to lift the MFJ's manufacturing and
information services restrictions, a reporter wrote:
Key lawmakers ...are growing increasingly nervous about keeping the seven
largest and most sophisticated communications companies out of manufacturing and
information services - a situation, they are told, that could stymie the development
of technology already available in other nations, and thus hurt U.S. industrial
competitiveness.
This rising concern over the United States' declining share of international trade
has only intensified a long-held feeling among some in Congress and the executive
branch that [Judge] Greene has assumed too much power over the telecommunica-
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ments, then they jeopardize the consent decree process. In passing the
APPA, Congress emphasized that the law was not intended to make settle-
ment by consent decree a less attractive alternative. To the contrary, Con-




Though the APPA's procedural and substantive standards apply only
when district courts review proposed decrees, they have proven to be useful
guidance for court's reviewing uncontested modifications to existing consent
decrees. In general, courts have afforded the government wide latitude in
making public interest determinations. If the government's assessment of
the proposed modification falls within the broad parameters of legitimate
public policy options, courts have deferred to those determinations and,
therefore, granted the motions to modify the decree. The AT&T decree
court is a notable exception. That court established a rigorous standard of
review that jeopardizes the viability of the consent decree process and is pos-
tions industry. They say his decisions have affected not only antitrust policy but
have implications for telecommunications policy as well.
Alyson Pytte, 'Baby Bell' Regulators Struggle for Power, 47 CONG. Q. 2209, 2209 (1989).
Beginning in 1986, Congress has considered various legislative proposals that would permit
the BOCs to engage in operations that the MFJ currently prohibits. See S. 2565, 99th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1986) (proposing the transfer of the MFJ from the United States District Court for
the Distict of the District of Columbia to the Federal Communications Commission); H.R.
2030, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (proposing that the BOCs be permitted to manufacture
telecommunications equipment and to provide information services); H.R. 2140, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess. (1989) (proposing that the BOCs be permitted to manufacture both telecommunica-
tions and customer premises equipment and to provide information services); S. 173, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (proposing that the BOCs be permitted to manufacture telecommunica-
tions equipment); H.R. 1523, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (proposing that the BOCs be per-
mitted to manufacture telecommunications equipment); H.R. 1527, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1991) (proposing that the BOCs be permitted to manufacture telecommunications equip-
ment); H.R. 3515, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (proposing that the BOCs, currently allowed to
offer information services, provide such services, subject to certain regulatory safeguards). But
see H.R. 5096, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (proposing that the MFJ's lines of business restric-
tions be codified).
Both the House and the Senate also have considered several resolutions expressing the
"sense" of each body regarding the need to remove the MFJ's lines of business restrictions.
See H.R. Con. Res. 339, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) (proposing that the House adopt the
position that the BOCs should be permitted to manufacture telecommunications and customer
premises equipment and to provide information services); S. Con. Res. 161, 100th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1988) (proposing that Congress determine whether BOCs should be permitted to manu-
facture telecommunications and customer premises equipment and to provide information
services); S. Con. Res. 34, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (proposing theat Congress confirm that
it is the legislature's responsibility to establish national telecommunications policy).
226. SENATE REPORT, supra note 24, at 6.
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sibly unconstitutional. A "zone of settlements" standard, which borrows
many of the APPA's procedural and substantive elements, would provide
the courts with uniformity and regularity that is both constitutional and
practical.
Justin Weaver Lilley

